SIU Executive Vice President Augie Tellez presented testimony Oct. 17 to the U.S. House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure’s Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation.
Chaired by Rep. Elijah Cummings (D-Md.), the Subcommittee conducted a hearing “to receive testimony on trends and innovations in mariner education and to assess how growing workforce shortages will affect the maritime industry as trade continues to increase.” In announcing the hearing, the Subcommittee indicated it specifically would “consider the possible impact of various factors on workforce shortage, including wage levels; lifestyle challenges associated with employment in the maritime industry; and training requirements imposed by the Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping (STCW) Convention.”
In addition to the SIU’s Tellez, the other panelists testifying were Coast Guard Rear Adm. Joel Whitehead; Maritime Administrator Sean Connaughton; Michael Rodriguez, executive assistant to the president of the Masters, Mates & Pilots; Carl Annessa, chief operating officer/vice president for operations of Hornbeck Offshore Services for the Offshore Marine Service Association; Cathy Hammond, CEO of Inland Marine Services for American Waterway Operators; retired Navy Adm. John Craine Jr., president of the State University of New York Maritime College; William Beacom, navigation consultant for Professional Mariner; Capt. Arthur H. Sulzer, USN (Ret), board member, Maritime Academy Charter High School; Capt. Jeff Slesinger, director of safety and training, Western Towboat Company; and Berit Ericksson, former executive director, Pacific Coast Maritime Consortium.
Besides submitting written testimony, witnesses (divided into three panels) offered oral statements and answered questions from Subcommittee members. Among other points, Tellez emphasized that shipboard manpower “must be addressed in the context of national security.” He cited sealift lessons learned by our nation after the Persian Gulf War, including the need for a strong Ready Reserve Force adequately crewed so the ships are properly maintained and ready to mobilize. He also noted the cooperative efforts between the SIU, its contracted operators and the union-affiliated Paul Hall Center for Maritime Training and Education—efforts that have strongly contributed to the nation’s manpower pool of skilled, loyal, U.S. citizen seafarers.
Tellez also expressed dismay at the recent announcement by the U.S. Maritime Administration concerning a reduction in crew sizes that is expected to accompany the agency’s takeover of the fast sealift ships (an issue that was reported at all SIU membership meetings in October).
Excerpts from his written statement follow. Visit the “Heard at Headquarters” section of www.seafarers.org for a link to individual statements by all panelists as well as by Rep. Cummings and Rep. James Oberstar (D-Minn.), chairman of the full committee.
Excerpts from SIU Statement
I would like to thank the Committee for the opportunity to appear before you today and to express our thanks for the continued support of the Congress for the Maritime Security Program (MSP), the Jones Act and Cargo Preference that play a vital role in ensuring that the United States-flag fleet is generally not experiencing the kind of manpower shortages at issue here today, and can continue to supply the trained manpower essential to maintaining U.S. strategic sealift capabilities. At the same time, I would be remiss in not pointing out that a recent government decision was made in order to save a relatively small amount of money by reducing crews in the vital U.S. Ready Reserve Force. This potentially sets a dangerous precedent and could create significant problems down the line by eroding the pool of well-trained, loyal, U.S.-citizen crews whom our military depend upon during times of conflict….
United States-flag vessels operating in the deep sea ocean trades are not experiencing the manpower shortages that are the subject of today’s hearing. The reasons for this include the MSP program enacted by Congress in 1996 and re-authorized in 2003; the preferences granted to United States-flag vessels for the carriage of military and commercial U.S. Government owned or impelled cargoes by Cargo Preference Laws enacted over the years; ongoing support for the Jones Act; maintenance of the RRF; and the general support of the Congress for emphasizing the use of commercial vessels for military cargoes expressed by the National Security Sealift Policy adopted by Presidential Directive in 1989. In combination, these programs and policies have enabled the United States to maintain a commercially viable and militarily useful fleet of privately owned vessels, manned by U.S. citizen crews, in active service in the international and domestic trades.
In 2004, pursuant to Congressional direction in the Maritime Security Act of 2003 to study the Maritime Security and Cargo Preference programs, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded that: “The cargo preference and Maritime Security Programs both provide incentives to retain privately owned U.S.-flag ships and their U.S. citizen crews for commercial and national defense purposes.”
As stated by the Department of Defense in its comments on that report, “The Department of Defense supports a strong and viable United States Merchant Marine which provides DOD with needed U.S.-flag vessels and mariners during war. The Cargo Preference and Maritime Security Programs are vital to the U.S. Merchant Marine and DOD.”
The direct linkage between these programs and U.S. strategic sealift capabilities is clear. Today 60 militarily useful vessels are enrolled in the Maritime Security Program, while, according to the GAO, on average almost 200 United States-flag vessels participate in the carriage of military and commercial preference cargoes. The contributions made by these vessels to defense sealift are two-fold.
First, the vessels themselves are available for use by the military for defense cargoes. This is particularly true for the 60 vessels in the Maritime Security Fleet.
As important, however, is the contribution made to creating and sustaining a pool of skilled and experienced seafarers that the Departments of Defense and Transportation can draw upon to provide augmentation crews for strategic sealift vessels kept in reduced operating or reserve status when not required for contingency operations. In general, to provide for crew rotations, training ashore, vacations and sick leave, for every billet on board those vessels, there are approximately 1.5 trained and experienced U.S. citizen seafarers. It is those seafarers who form a substantial part of the manpower pool that can be called upon to crew vessels being activated from those reserve or reduced operating status fleets.
The importance of these ships and crews to military sealift is evidenced by their continued role in supporting Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. To augment active privately owned, militarily useful vessels in commercial service and U.S. Government-owned active sealift forces, the United States maintains a fleet of approximately 45 sealift vessels in reserve or reduced operating status. During the period between October 2001 and February 2006, vessels activated from those reserve fleets transported 28.2 percent (U.S.-flag commercial vessels carried most of the remaining 71.8 percent), or almost a third, of all military equipment and supplies delivered to U.S. forces in those contingency operations.
One of the sealift lessons learned through Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990-91 was that because of the age of many of these vessels, and the lack of any crew on board during reserve status, the vessels experienced a high operating failure rate during the initial surge to this earlier war. Crew shortages also became an issue because the only manpower pool that was available to man the government-owned vessels had to come from the U.S.-flag commercial fleet.
After extensive study and analysis, in the mid-1990s the Department of Defense and the U.S. Maritime Administration changed the way that the government vessels would be maintained to solve the crewing issues encountered during the first Gulf War. In short, the Maritime Administration established a Reserve Operating Status Maintenance Program that placed a cadre of U.S. crews on board groups of reserve vessels in order to maintain the ships in a higher state of readiness.
During Operation Iraqi Freedom, these ships were again called upon for initial surge transport, but unlike in Operation Desert Shield, the ships performed flawlessly, and most importantly, because of the small cadre of crew already on board the ships for maintenance there was a nucleus crew ready to sail the ships. By making the change in the mid-1990s, it increased the manpower pool by a small amount, but that was sufficient to help solve the crewing issues experienced during Desert Storm.
Overall, it must be emphasized that in addition to the RRF crews, without the trained and experienced mariners drawn from the manpower pool made possible by the United States-flag commercial fleet supported by the Maritime Security Program, Cargo Preference programs and the Jones Act, it would have been impossible to crew up those vessels for Operation Iraqi Freedom.
This being said, I am very concerned with plans by the government, as a cost-saving device, to decrease the readiness of certain vessels and reduce or eliminate the crews originally put on board through the changes made to the RRF program after Operation Desert Storm. While we are experiencing no significant crew shortages at this time, with the downgrading of the Reserve vessels, any future use of those vessels for major sealift will clearly lead to crew shortages in both the Jones Act and international trades. The gradual reduction in entry-level shipboard positions in all three departments makes this situation even worse....
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